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Victory Improvised
Engineering Victory: How Technology Won the Civil War by Thomas F.
Army Jr. is one of several recent studies that examine military engineering in the
Civil War. These include Justin Solonick’s similarly titled Engineering Victory:
The Union Siege of Vicksburg (Southern Illinois University Press, 2015), which
focuses on the engineering aspects of that siege, and Earl Hess’s three works on
field fortifications: Field Armies and Fortifications in the Civil War, Trench
Warfare under Grant and Lee, and In the Trenches at Petersburg (University of
North Carolina Press, 2005, 2007, 2009). In his contribution to this trend, Army
maintains that the North won the war because of its advantage in mechanical
skills and a culture of innovation which gave Union armies an edge in military
engineering that enabled them to maintain lines of supply and communication
for operations deep inside Confederate territory.
Army develops this argument in three parts. The first explores the social
origins of the sections’ differing engineering capabilities. The author contends
that the rise of industry in the North prompted common school reforms and a
lyceum movement that enhanced literacy, numeracy, and basic knowledge, while
industrial development put a premium on technical innovation. As a
consequence, northern workers were given free rein to implement improvements
that were then shared through mechanics’ institutes, fairs and exhibitions, all of
which further diffused technical knowledge among the northern public. In the
South, however, the influence of slavery led to more limited educational
opportunities as elites opposed public education to prevent the spread of ideas
that could threaten slavery. Moreover, the few industrial concerns in the South
were staffed largely by slaves who were neither encouraged to innovate nor
permitted to share ideas. Because of these differences, the northern population
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was more amenable to a system of bottom-up technical innovation that enhanced
the North’s wartime engineering capacity.
Part II of Engineering Victory focuses on the establishment, composition,
and initial operations of Civil War engineering forces. The Union’s one regular
Engineer Company was enlarged and supplemented with three new companies to
form the Engineer Battalion, but this unit provided only a small portion of the
engineering arm for a single Federal army. Union commanders accepted
specialized volunteer units to expand their engineering capabilities, and in the
west, they also detailed infantry units to serve as pioneers and assist with
engineering duties. Because of the northern economy and educational system,
the members of the various Union volunteer engineer units and many northern
infantrymen had some mechanical aptitude. Lacking similar resources, the
Confederacy never had enough engineers. Army buttresses this point by
identifying a pattern of Confederate failure and improvisational Union success in
early engineering operations. In the west, the Confederacy’s insufficiency of
engineers led to the poor position of Fort Henry on the Tennessee River, while
the ingenuity of northern volunteer engineers was demonstrated when they
devised an apparatus to cut trees below the waterline of a bayou in order to open
a canal across a bend in the Mississippi and bypass Island No. 10. Similarly, a
failure of Confederate mapmakers during the 1862 Peninsula Campaign cost
Joseph Johnston an opportunity to benefit from George McClellan’s division of
his army across the Chickahominy River at the Battle of Seven Pines. James
Longstreet’s Confederate corps took the wrong road, snarled up Johnston’s
advance, and deprived the southern attack of much of its intended force. In the
same engagement, however, the ingenuity of Union soldiers saved Erasmus
Keyes’ IV Corps. Before the battle Federal engineers had built several bridges
over the river, and two more, Sumner’s Upper and Lower bridges, were
improvised by volunteer infantry regiments from Edwin Sumner’s II Corps. As
Army points out, Sumner’s Upper Bridge was critical in moving reinforcements
from Sumner’s corps to shore up the hard-pressed IV Corps during the battle,
although the author neglects to mention that Sumner’s Lower Bridge collapsed
and could not be used. While astute readers will wish that the positions of these
two improvised structures had not been reversed on the map Army provides
(123), his claim for the significance of one of them still stands.
Army also applies his argument to railroad management. Drawing on
northern experiences with larger complex railroads managed by delegating
authority to competent subordinates, the Union took control of critical lines in
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1862. The United States Military Railroads under Daniel McCallum provided
oversight and minimized the chaos previously caused by the interference of
military officers. Appointed to assist McCallum, Herman Haupt laid the
foundation for the United States Construction Corps by assigning men from
infantry units to maintain and repair the railroad on the basis of their prewar
occupations. Without the same antebellum tradition of railroad management or a
similar pool of skilled labor, Army argues, the Confederacy could not create an
efficient organization to manage its rail lines.
Federal military forces also improved their field engineering organizations
in 1862, following the lead of William Rosecrans. When he assumed command
of the Army of the Cumberland that fall, Rosecrans had only two regular
engineer officers and a handful of volunteer engineer troops. His first innovation
was in mapping; Rosecrans assigned non-engineering volunteer officers to
collect topographical information and forward it to Captain Nathaniel Michler,
the regular topographical engineer on his staff. This expanded Michler’s ability
to produce maps for field operations. Likewise, Rosecrans had his other regular
engineer, Captain James Morton, organize permanent pioneer brigades by
detailing soldiers with mechanical skills from each regiment. This allowed the
general to quickly augment his engineering force. All of this was possible,
according to Army, because northern volunteers had sufficient mechanical
knowledge to be rapidly converted into a close approximation of military
engineers. This argument, however, could have been further refined by clearly
acknowledging Rosecrans’s engineering background. Instead, Army implies on
page 73 that he was one of many prewar officers who served in non-engineering
branches or picked up technical skills during a civilian career when, in fact, Old
Rosy served in the antebellum Corps of Engineers for a dozen years.
Nevertheless, the author’s contention that by the end of 1862 Union military
leadership had recognized the engineering potential of their volunteers and
established an organization to tap that potential remains valid.
In the final section, the author explores the impact of the Union’s 
engineering capability on the major campaigns from 1863 through 1865. He 
finds that the previously established pattern continued; the Confederacy could 
not match Union technical improvisation. For instance, during Lee’s withdrawal 
after Gettysburg, his army was delayed ten days while southern engineers 
cobbled together a bridge over the Potomac. Lee had earlier refused to combine 
the pioneer companies of his army’s divisions into a dedicated engineer regiment 
because, Army writes, he “believed it was impracticable to get an engineer
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regiment into combat” (217). That is somewhat misleading. Lee was worried that
a large engineer regiment would be less efficient in combat, but he also feared
that if pioneer companies were removed from their divisions to form a larger
unit, his division commanders would draw more men from infantry regiments to
create new divisional pioneer companies, reducing the army’s fighting force
(OR, series 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 1017). Lee’s concerns suggests that it may not
necessarily have been a lack of skilled manpower that disadvantaged the
Confederacy in engineering operations. Perhaps it was just the disparity in
overall manpower that gave northern leaders the opportunity to create dedicated,
if improvised, engineering units, an opportunity, as Army clearly demonstrates,
of which they took full advantage.
Moreover, additional consideration of the Overland and Petersburg
campaigns might have further refined Army’s largely negative view of
Confederate technical innovation. Instead, his treatment of these operations is
limited by his concentration on the logistical consequences of military
engineering. His discussion of the Overland Campaign focuses almost
exclusively on Grant’s movements, even though Earl Hess has concluded in
Trench Warfare under Grant and Lee that the expanded use of field fortifications
in this campaign was first improvised by Confederate officers and men in
response to Grant’s policy of continuous contact. Similarly, Army neglects most
of the engineering-related operations around Petersburg, except for events
leading to the Battle of the Crater. In the neglected operations, however, at least
one Confederate soldier improvised a method of detecting Federal mining
activity. While not critical to the campaign, such action suggests the type of
bottom-up innovation that the author finds lacking among Confederate forces
(Hess, In the Trenches at Petersburg, 112).
Thomas Army Jr. has produced an interesting and thought-provoking study
of military engineering in the Civil War with which students of the war,
logistics, and technology will have to reckon. While his ultimate conclusion that
the Union’s engineering advantage was the critical reason for northern victory is
still open for debate, he has launched what looks to be a profitable and enjoyable
discussion, one that could benefit from a similar analysis of the well-known
Confederate naval innovations such as the submarine, torpedo boat, and ironclad.
Mark A. Smith is an associate professor of history at Fort Valley State 
University in central Georgia. His book, Engineering Security: The Corps of 
Engineers and Third System Defense Policy, 1815-1861 (University of Alabama
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Press, 2009), examines the national defense policy developed and implemented
by the Corps of Engineers between the War of 1812 and the Civil War. He is
currently editing a journal and memoir by a Union engineer soldier.
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